Arbitrage and relative value
Fixed income relative value
Fixed income relative value trades the small differences between instruments that should be priced almost identically: a bond against the future it can be delivered into, a newly issued government bond against the one before it, swaps against government bonds, one point on the yield curve against its neighbours. Each gap is tiny, so the trades are financed in the repo market and heavily levered.
At a glance
At a glance
- Makes money from
- Convergence of closely related instruments, plus carry and roll-down
- Holds positions for
- Weeks to months
- Trades
- Government bonds, bond futures, interest rate swaps and repo
- Biggest risk
- Leverage and funding: if financing tightens or spreads widen first, positions are forced out
- Who does it
- Rates teams at multi-strategy hedge funds such as Citadel and Millennium, and bank rates desks
- ~$1tn – estimated size of the Treasury basis trade (2025 estimates)
- 50:1 – leverage possible when repo haircuts are near zero (or more)
- $818 – value of a basis point on $1m of 10-year bonds (at a 4% yield)
- $3.6bn – LTCM rescue, from 14 firms (September 1998)
- 2.43→5.25% – overnight repo rate in a day (17 September 2019)
- £19.3bn – of gilts bought by the Bank of England (autumn 2022)
The business
Government bonds, the futures on them, interest rate swaps and the repo market that finances them are among the deepest markets in the world, and the prices across them are linked by arithmetic. When the links slip – because one investor needs a particular bond, because dealers are short of balance sheet, because a new bond is in demand – a relative value fund buys the cheap side, sells the rich side and waits for the gap to close.
The gaps are a few hundredths of a percentage point, so the trades are financed with borrowed money in repo: the fund buys a bond, lends it out as collateral for cash, and uses the cash to pay for it. With little or no haircut on Treasury repo, leverage of 50 to 1 is possible. Hedge funds running these trades are now among the largest holders of Treasury futures, and the Federal Reserve watches the basis trade as a possible source of stress.
A cash–futures basis trade
Who is on the other side? Mostly asset managers, who want interest-rate exposure through futures because they need little cash. Their demand makes futures slightly rich to bonds, and the basis trade is paid for supplying it.
A trade, step by step
A Treasury future can be settled with any of a basket of bonds, each scaled by a conversion factor. The seller delivers a bond and is paid the invoice price: the futures price times the conversion factor, plus the coupon accrued on the bond. The return from buying the bond now and delivering it, financed at the repo rate, is the implied repo rate; when it is above the actual repo rate, the trade pays.
Worked example
A Treasury basis trade
A 4% bond trades at 100.25 with 0.50 of accrued coupon. The future trades at 111.47, the bond’s conversion factor is 0.9012, delivery is in three months, and three-month repo is 4.30%. All prices per 100 of face value; delivery options and the timing of margin are left out.
- Cost of the bond100.75
- Invoice at delivery101.957
- Implied repo rate4.79%
- Repo interest1.083
- Profit per 1000.124
- On $100m of bonds≈ $124,000
- Futures to sell901 contracts
About 0.12% in three months – trivial unlevered. Financed with a 2% haircut, the $2 million of capital earns 6% in a quarter, about 25% a year. The same leverage means a small widening of the basis, or a rise in margins, can force the position out before delivery.
The basis trade, taken apart
The maths that matters
Duration and DV01. A bond’s price falls when yields rise. DV01 is the change in value for a one-basis-point rise; for $1 million of a 10-year 4% bond at a 4% yield it is about $818. Modified duration is the same thing as a percentage: 8.176, or about 8.18. Convexity, 78.9, is the curvature: for a 100 basis point rise the price changes by , against an exact −7.79%.
Hedging by DV01. Relative value positions are sized so that a parallel move in rates leaves them flat. DV01 per $1 million is about $190 for a 2-year bond, $449 for a 5-year and $818 for a 10-year.
Worked example
Sizing a 2s5s10s butterfly
The five-year looks cheap against its neighbours (see the curve below). Buy $100 million of five-year bonds, and sell two- and ten-year bonds with half the risk on each wing.
- Risk bought$44,900 per bp
- Each wing$22,450 per bp
- Two-year to sell≈ $118m
- Ten-year to sell≈ $27.4m
A parallel move in yields now leaves the position flat, and so does a steepening that pivots on the five-year. What is left is a bet that the five-year’s yield falls relative to the average of its neighbours. Weighting the wings by how each actually moves, using principal components, makes it neutral to the slope as well.
A cheap point on the curve
Principal components. Daily changes in the yield curve are dominated by three patterns: all yields moving together (level), short and long yields moving apart (slope), and the middle moving against both ends (curvature). Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) found these three explain almost all of the variation; relative value traders hedge out the first two or three, and trade what is left.
Level, slope and curvature
Where the money comes from
- The cash–futures basis: futures rich to bonds, because asset managers prefer futures – the largest trade by size.
- On-the-run against off-the-run: the newest bond of a maturity is the most liquid and trades at a premium, which fades as it ages and a newer one is issued.
- Swap spreads: swap rates against government bond yields of the same maturity, driven by the supply of bonds and the cost of dealer balance sheets.
- Curve trades: butterflies and spreads between maturities, sized to be neutral to level and slope.
- Cross-market: the same maturity in different countries’ bonds, hedged for currency.
- Carry and roll-down: what a position earns as time passes if nothing else changes – the coupon against the financing, plus the gain as a bond rolls down a sloping curve.
Relative value trades and what makes them pay
| Trade | Long | Short | Pays when |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basis | Bond, financed in repo | Future | Delivery, if the implied repo rate beats repo |
| On/off-the-run | Older bond | Newest bond | The new bond’s premium fades |
| Swap spread | Bond, or swap | The other | Supply or balance-sheet pressure eases |
| Butterfly | Middle maturity | Both wings | The kink in the curve straightens |
Risk and what goes wrong
Relative value trades converge eventually; the danger is what happens first. The positions are large, levered and often similar across funds, and they depend on financing that can tighten exactly when spreads widen. A trade that is right at delivery can still be closed at a loss on the way.
Long-Term Capital Management · August–September 1998
After Russia defaulted, investors fled to the most liquid bonds and every relative value spread widened at once. LTCM, levered about 25 to 1 on its balance sheet, lost about $4.6 billion; 14 banks and brokers put in $3.6 billion under the Federal Reserve’s coordination to wind it down.
The repo spike · 17 September 2019
With cash drained by tax payments and Treasury settlements, the secured overnight financing rate jumped from 2.43% to 5.25% in a day. The Fed began lending in repo again for the first time since the financial crisis.
The dash for cash · March 2020
Investors sold even Treasuries to raise dollars, the basis widened and margins rose, and funds unwound basis trades into a market that could not absorb them. The Fed bought about $1.6 trillion of Treasuries in a matter of weeks.
UK pension funds and gilts · September 2022
After the UK’s mini-budget, gilt yields jumped and pension funds’ liability-driven hedges, levered with derivatives and repo, faced collateral calls they could meet only by selling gilts. The Bank of England bought £19.3 billion to stop the spiral.
The swap-spread unwind · April 2025
After the US tariff announcements, long-dated Treasury yields rose sharply relative to swaps as levered swap-spread positions were cut – a reminder that the trade’s risk is liquidity, not the long-run value.
Technology and data
- Curve-fitting models that value every bond against a smooth curve, to find the cheap and rich ones.
- Pricing for futures baskets, delivery options, swaps and repo, and the analytics that convert all of them to DV01 and principal-component risk.
- Data on positioning, auction sizes and dealer balance sheets, which drive many of the gaps.
- Financing management: repo across many counterparties and terms, margins at clearing houses, and stress tests of both.
- Electronic trading in Treasuries and futures, increasingly with the same automation as other markets.
Who works here
Portfolio manager or trader
Runs a book of relative value trades: finds the gaps, sizes positions by risk, manages the financing, and decides when a gap is opportunity and when it is a warning.
Quant researcher or strat
Builds the curve, basis and swap-spread models, principal-component hedges and relative-value signals, and the risk and stress tests behind them.
Financing and treasury
Manages repo and margin across counterparties – at a levered fund, as important as the trades themselves.
In interviews for this desk
Expect bond maths – yield, duration, DV01, convexity – how futures and repo work, and principal components of the curve (level, slope, curvature). Rates desks also ask about current central-bank policy.
What is the DV01 of $1 million of a 10-year 4% bond yielding 4%?
At par its modified duration is about 8.18, so DV01 ≈ . A quick check: duration of a par bond is a little under its maturity, because of the coupons.
Using duration 8.176 and convexity 78.9, what happens to its price if yields rise 100bp?
; the exact repricing gives −7.79%. Convexity cushions losses and adds to gains.
The future is 111.47, conversion factor 0.9012, the bond costs 100.75 including accrued, and it accrues 1.00 more by delivery in three months. What is the implied repo rate?
Invoice , so the implied repo rate is . If term repo is 4.30%, buy the bond, finance it and sell the future.
You buy $100m of five-year bonds (DV01 $449 per $1m). Size a 2s5s10s butterfly with 2-year DV01 $190 and 10-year $818, half the risk on each wing.
per wing: sell m of two-year and m of ten-year bonds.
What are the first three principal components of yield curve moves?
Level (all yields move together), slope (short and long move apart) and curvature (the middle against the ends). Together they explain almost all daily variation; relative value trades are hedged against level and usually slope.
Why did LTCM fail if its trades were right in the long run?
Its spreads widened together after Russia’s default, as investors fled to liquidity, and its leverage meant it could not wait for them to converge. Its positions were also large and known, so others traded against it. Convergence trades need capital that can survive the path, not only the destination.
Why do Treasury futures trade rich to bonds in the first place?
Asset managers want long duration through futures, because futures need little cash. Someone has to be short the futures and long the bonds, financed in repo, and is paid a small premium for using balance sheet – the basis.
Firm guides: Citadel
Glossary
- DV01
- The change in value for a one-basis-point rise in yield.
- Duration
- Price sensitivity to yield, as a percentage per unit change.
- Convexity
- How duration itself changes as yields move.
- Repo
- Borrowing cash against a bond as collateral, with an agreement to buy it back.
- Haircut
- The amount by which collateral exceeds the cash lent against it.
- Conversion factor
- The scaling that makes different bonds deliverable into the same future.
- Implied repo rate
- The financing rate at which buying the bond and delivering it breaks even.
- Cheapest to deliver
- The bond in a future’s basket that is most profitable to deliver.
- On-the-run
- The most recently issued government bond of a maturity, and the most liquid.
- Swap spread
- The swap rate minus the government bond yield of the same maturity.
- Butterfly
- Long the middle of the curve against both wings, or the reverse.
- Roll-down
- The gain as a bond ages and its yield moves down a sloping curve.
Further reading
- The Treasury Bond Basis – Galen Burghardt and Terrence Belton, 2005. The standard book on bond futures
- Fixed Income Securities – Bruce Tuckman and Angel Serrat, 2022. Fourth edition
- Common Factors Affecting Bond Returns – Robert Litterman and José Scheinkman, 1991. Journal of Fixed Income
- When Genius Failed – Roger Lowenstein, 2000. The story of Long-Term Capital Management
- The Bond/Old-Bond Spread – Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2002. Journal of Financial Economics; on-the-run against off-the-run